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  Greater recognition by economists of the influential role that concern for distributional equity 
exerts on decision making in a variety of economic contexts has spurred interest in empirical research 
on the public judgments of fair distribution.  Using a stated-preference experimental design, this paper 
contributes to the growing literature on fair division by investigating the empirical support for each of 
five distributional principles — equal division among recipients, Rawlsian maximin, total benefit 
maximization, equal benefit for recipients, and allocation according to relative need among recipients 
— in the division of a fixed bundle of a good across settings that differ with respect to the good being 
allocated (a health care good — pills, and non-health care but still health-affecting good — apples) 
and the way that alternative possible divisions of the good are described (quantitative information only, 
verbal information only, and both).  It also offers new evidence on sample effects (university sample 
vs. community samples) and how the aggregate ranking of principles is affected by alternative vote-
scoring methods.  We find important information effects.  When presented with quantitative information 
only, support for the division to equalize benefit across recipients is consistent with that found in 
previous research; changing to verbal descriptions causes a notable shift in support among principles, 
especially between equal division of the goods and total benefit maximization.  The judgments made 
when presented with both quantitative and verbal information match more closely those made with 
quantitative-only descriptions rather than verbal-only descriptions, suggesting that the quantitative 
information dominates.  The information effects we observe are consistent with a lack of 
understanding among participants as to the relationship between the principles and the associated 
quantitative allocations. We also find modest good effects in the expected direction:  the fair division of 
pills is tied more closely to benefit-related criterion than is the fair division of apples (even though both 
produce health benefits).  We find evidence of only small differences between the university and 
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  Economists increasingly seek a greater understanding of individuals’ judgments of 
distributional equity.  This interest in equity judgments arises from the growing recognition that social, 
other-regarding preferences — including attitudes regarding equity — direct individual, firm and 
government behaviour in a wide variety of economically important decision contexts (Charness and 
Rabin 2002; Konow 2003), including pricing decisions (Kahneman et al. 1986), the allocation of 
property rights in emerging markets (Young 1995), regulatory policy (Zajac 1995), and the allocation of 
goods, services and opportunities by governmental and non-governmental institutions in a wide variety 
of non-market settings such education and health care (Elster 1992).   These types of evidence 
challenge economists to re-think the role of equity in economic analysis and have spurred empirical 
research investigating the public’s views on equity.     
Equity is in many respects more elusive than efficiency. People frequently disagree on the 
equity-relevant outcomes and on what constitutes an equitable distribution of those outcomes. Yet, 
research demonstrates that when making equity judgments people draw on a small set of core 
concepts such as need, desert, responsibility and maximization (Konow 2003).   Judgments vary 
across individuals and contexts, however, because the weights people put on these core equity 
concepts depends on both the characteristics of those making the judgments and the features of the 
distributional problem itself.   
Using both stated-preference and revealed-preference experiments, research on fair distribution 
has documented the systematic relationships between equity judgments, the characteristics of the 
distribution problem and the characteristics of those rendering the judgments, enabling the 
development of more descriptively accurate theories of equity.  Konow (2003) provides a 
comprehensive review of the findings regarding fair division; here we highlight only selected prominent 
themes.  Experimental evidence documents, for example, that people’s judgments of the just 
distribution of a good are more egalitarian when the good is needed (in the sense that it provides a 
health benefit) than when it is desired simply to satisfy tastes  (Bar-Hillel and Yaari 1993; Yaari and 
Bar-Hillel 1984).   In production contexts, judgments of just distribution favour recipients who are more 
productive and are responsible for their greater differing productivities (e.g., Faravelli 2007; Gaertner 
and Schwettmann 2007; Schokkaert and Devooght 2003; Schokkaert and Lagrou 1983; Schokkaert 
and Overlaet 1989).   Differences in productivity, however, carry less weight when they are beyond the 
control of individuals.  Such evidence is consistent with the notion of “responsibility-fair” compensation, 
which compensates individuals only for disadvantages that arise from differences in productivity 
beyond their control (e.g., natural talent) and which holds them responsible for differences in 
productivity arising from factors under their control (e.g., effort) (Fleurbaey 1998).   People are even HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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willing to bear a cost (in the form of reduced total output to be shared by their group) to allocate 
resources toward a less productive but more needy or deserving member of the group, though the 
willingness to do so falls as the cost rises (Gaertner 1994; Gaertner et al. 2001; Gaertner and 
Jungeilges 2002; Nord et al. 1995; Yaari and Bar-Hillel 1984).    
Judgments of fair distribution vary across cultures (Gaertner et al. 2001; Jungeilges and 
Theisen 2008; Schokkaert et al. 2007; Schokkaert and Devooght 2003), and researchers have 
investigated  the relationship between fairness judgments and individual characteristics such as sex, 
age, political ideology and education.   The relationship between equity judgments and education has 
received particular scrutiny in part because many studies draw their samples from university students, 
and especially economics students.   A person’s overall level of education has generally not been 
found to exert a large effect on equity judgments (Schokkaert & Capeau 1991;Gaertner & 
Schwettmann 2007), a finding consistent with the general conclusion in the broader experimental 
economics literature of  no substantial differences between university and community samples (Ball 
and Cech 1996).
1
Our stated-preference design builds explicitly on the seminal studies of Yaari and Bar-Hillel 
(1993; 1984) investigating the just division of a fixed amount of a good (e.g., grapefruit) between two 
individuals.  Their studies showed that, even for the same good, support for alternative theories of just 
distribution differs markedly when the underlying motivation for consuming a good varied between 
need, tastes, and beliefs.  We instead compare how judgments of the fair division differ for two distinct 
goods, both of which are needed because of their beneficial health effects:  one (pain-relief pills) is 
  Finally, studies find greater consensus regarding equity judgments when 
descriptions of a distribution problem include more concrete detail regarding both the individuals 
involved and the good being allocated than when they are framed in generic, abstract language, 
presumably because the richer descriptions reduce the variation in implicit assumptions respondents 
make regarding aspects of a scenario not explicitly described (Faravelli 2007).   
This paper contributes to the growing literature on fair division by investigating the empirical 
support for each of five distributional principles — equal division among recipients, Rawlsian maximin, 
total benefit maximization, equal benefit for recipients, and allocation according to relative need 
among recipients — across settings that differ with respect to the good being allocated and the way 
alternative divisions of the good are described.  In addition, it offers new evidence on sample effects 
(university sample vs. community samples); distinguishes support for a minimum-allocation principle 
and the principle of total benefit maximization that previous research has at times confounded; and it 
elicits judgments of both the most-fair and least-fair division of the good, allowing us to examine how 
aggregate rankings of the principles are affected by alternative vote-scoring methods.   
                                                 
1This conclusion regarding the influence of overall level of education differs from that for economics training specifically, 
for which studies often find a large effect (Amiel and Cowell 1999; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Faravelli 2007; Fehr et al. 
2006). The extent to which such effects of economics training arise from selection effects or training effects is debated. PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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explicitly a health care good; the other (apples) is not.  Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) also found that, 
when a good was needed, the vast majority of respondents chose as most-just the unequal division of 
the goods that equalized the benefit obtained by each recipient.  In the survey, Yaari and Bar-Hillel 
presented alternative choice options using only quantitative information.  If there were 12 grapefruit to 
divide between two individuals, for example, the choice alternatives were listed as 6:6, 2:10, 12:0, or 
0:12.  But because alternative equity principles can lead to the same quantitative allocation, the 
underlying equity principle, or reasoning, generating these judgments sometimes remains ambiguous.  
In the fair-division problems they analysed, for instance, the principles of equal benefit for each 
recipient, proportionality in meeting needs, Rawlsian maximin, and certain bargaining-based 
conceptions of equity all generate the same quantitative division that participants chose most 
frequently.    
We sought to gain more detailed insight into the underlying equity principles guiding such 
choices by varying the way choice alternatives are described. We described alternative divisions in 
three ways:  (1) using quantitative information only, as did Yaari and Bar-Hillel and, to our knowledge, 
as have all other studies of fair division but one (Schokkaert et al. 2007); (2) using only verbal 
(written)
2
We study equity judgments for health-related allocation problems both for analytic reasons — 
the concept of need arises naturally in health-related settings — and for policy reasons — the health 
care sector is large (10% or more of GDP in many developed nations (OECD 2007)), health care 
evokes stronger equity concern than just about any other commodity (though the precise concept of 
equity to guide system development and resource allocation is highly contested (Culyer and Wagstaff 
1993; Hurley 2000; Williams and Cookson 2000)), and large-scale public intervention in the health 
care sector means that governments explicitly guide the allocation of a large proportion of health care 
 descriptions of five alternative distributional principles; and (3) using both verbal descriptions 
of alternative principles and the quantitative allocations associated with each principle.  This design 
provides insight into the underlying equity principles motivating participants’ judgments and the extent 
to which participants understand the correspondence between the principle themselves and the 
divisions they generate.  The only other work of which we are aware that compares verbal and 
quantitative descriptions in a study of fair division is Schokkaert et al.’s (2007) study of fair division in a 
production context, which found that verbal and quantitative descriptions led to important differences 
in support for the no-envy criterion and a principle of responsibility.  Amiel and Cowell (1999) also 
studied verbal and quantitative descriptions, but they did so as part of an investigation of judgments of 
inequality.  They found little difference in judgments based on based on verbal descriptions of income 
distributions compared to those based on numerical distributions.   
                                                 
2 The term “verbal” can refer to both oral (i.e. spoken) descriptions and to written descriptions that use words rather than 
numbers. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted explicitly, all references to verbal descriptions mean written 
descriptions using words rather than numbers.  HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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resources.  Indeed, many governments explicitly divide a fixed health budget among regional health 
authorities or institutions (Rice and Smith 2001), facing a distribution problem that corresponds 
precisely to that investigated in much research on fair division.  Governments increasingly divide such 
fixed budgets using formula-based allocation methods that appeal explicitly to equity principles, such 
as needs-based funding, for which the empirical support has been little tested (Rice and Smith 2001; 
Smith et al. 2001).  We are aware of only two studies (Kahneman and Varey 1991; Schokkaert and 
Devooght 2003) that use a health care setting to study fair division.
3
                                                 
3There is a large medical literature on rationing and resource allocation in clinical contexts (Ubel 2001), and a literature on 
priority-setting in health care that deals in part with distributional equity (and especially equity-efficiency trade-offs) (e.g., 
Cookson and Dolan (1999)).  Although these literatures provide considerable insight into aspects of people’s reasoning 
about equity in allocation, its focus is distinct from this study and the broader economic literature on fair division. 
 
We find important information effects.  When presented with quantitative information only, 
support for the division to equalize benefit across recipients is remarkably similar to that observed by 
Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1993).  Changing from quantitative to verbal descriptions causes a notable shift in 
support among principles, especially between equal division of the goods and total benefit 
maximization. The verbal-only responses also reveal that among the three principles that lead to this 
quantitative allocation, the proportionality-based principle of allocation according to relative need 
receives the most support, followed by the egalitarian principle of equal benefit, and finally Rawlsian 
maximin.   The judgments made when presented with both quantitative and verbal information match 
more closely those made with quantitative-only descriptions rather than verbal-only descriptions, 
suggesting that the quantitative information dominates.  The information effects we observe are 
consistent with a lack of understanding among participants as to the relationship between the 
principles (as described verbally) and the associated quantitative allocations. We also find modest 
good effects in the expected direction:  the fair division of pills is tied more closely to benefit-related 
criteria than is the fair division of apples (even though both produce health benefits).  And we find 
evidence of only small differences between the university and community samples. 
 
2.0 The Questionnaire and Survey Procedures 
We administered a stated-preference survey to elicit judgments of fairness in the division of a fixed, 
exogenously determined, amount of a good between two individuals.  Following Yaari and Bar-Hillel 
(1984; 1993), we sought impartial judgments of fair division: participants were put in the position of 
dis-interested, third-party observers with no stake in the outcomes, asked to render a judgment that 
had no consequences for themselves and that involved no strategic interaction with other participants.   
Below we describe in detail the design choices we made and the motivation for those choices.  For 
reference, Figure 1 presents two sample vignettes. 
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2.1. The Goods to be Allocated 
We studied the fair division of two goods:  an explicit health care good — pain-relief pills — and a non-
health care good — apples — that in this case was described as providing recipients a necessary 
vitamin but no other benefit (i.e., they were not desired for taste).  Hence, both goods are needed in 
the sense that their consumption is required to maintain or improve a recipient’s health.
4
All distributional vignettes pertained to the division of a fixed amount of either pills or apples 
between two potential recipients who differ in their ability to derive health benefit from the good in 
question.  For example, one individual obtained 2 hours of pain relief per pill while the second 
  We chose to 
compare these two types of goods for a number of reasons.  Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1993; 1984) show 
that, even for a non-health care good (grapefruit, avocados), judgments of just distribution differ 
markedly when the good is needed for a health-reason compared to when it is simply desired to 
satisfy tastes (with much greater emphasis on equalizing benefit across recipients when the good is 
needed to maintain health).   Presumably this effect would only be stronger if a needed health care 
good were compared against a standard consumption commodity.   Furthermore, many have argued 
that the distributional concern about health care derives solely from health care’s instrumental role in 
influencing the distribution of health (e.g., Culyer and Wagstaff 1993), and that the fair distribution of 
health care should derive solely from its effect on the distribution of health.  Comparing pain-relief pills 
and vitamin-providing apples allows us to test whether people’s judgment of the fair distribution of a 
health-affecting good derives solely from this instrumental relationship, or whether a type of   “health 
care” effect exists whereby the fair distribution of health care is judged differently than a non-health 
care good even when the latter also generates health benefits.  The possibility of such an effect is 
suggested by Walzer (1983) or Elster (1992) who argue that notions of equity are highly particularistic, 
or “local,” varying across domains defined in part by the good in question.   
The fair distribution of a health-affecting, non-health-care good is also a matter of some policy 
importance.  Governments increasingly define health-related policy objectives in terms of the level and 
distribution of population health. Given that many of the most important determinants of health lie 
outside the health care system (Barer et al. 1994), policies increasingly emphasize action on non-
heath-care determinants of health such as those in the physical environment (exposure to toxic 
substances), social environment (early childhood education), and transportation sector (mass transit).  
If the health effects of such non-health care determinants little influence views on the equitable 
distribution of such goods, implementing policies to affect improvements in health through non-health-
care determinants will be that much harder.    
                                                 
4 The concept of need is debated in economics (as well as other disciplines).  Our use of the term to refer to a situation in 
which a good generates health benefits (rather than simply utility benefits) is consistent both with previous literature on fair 
division (e.g., Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1993; 1984)) and the dominant definition of need in health economics (Culyer 1995; 
Culyer and Wagstaff 1993; Hurley 2000; Williams 1978).  HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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obtained 1 hour of pain relief, or one individual metabolized 2 units of vitamin per apple while the 
second metabolized 1 unit.  The differences in ability to derive benefit from the good were not caused 
by differences in the recipients’ behaviours for which they could be held responsible, precluding 
effects associated with notions of responsibility-fair compensation.  These differential productivities 
allow us to distinguish whether the equity judgments focus on the goods space itself (e.g., an equal 
division of the good) or in the outcomes space (e.g., allocate to equalize health benefit or to maximize 
health benefit).  Benefit was expressed in terms of health gain.     
 
2.2   The Distributional Principles 
We investigate the support for five equity principles.  The first three principle have been extensively 
investigated in previous work either because of their intuitive appeal or their link to prominent theories 
of justice:  equal division of a good among recipients; division to generate equal benefit to each of the 
recipients; and the maximin division, which maximizes the benefit to the least-well-off individual and is 
most closely associated with Rawls’ Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971).   The fourth principle — division 
according to relative need among the recipients — is commonly invoked in the health care sector, is 
the stated allocation objective of many public health care systems (Smith et al. 2001), and is 
commonly cited within systems of fiscal federalism as a principle to guide funding allocation from 
higher to lower levels of government.  It calls for proportionality in responding to needs, a principle at 
the foundation of many conceptions of equity (Young 1995).   The fifth principle, maximization of total 
benefit among recipients, is more commonly viewed by economists as an efficiency criterion, but it 
derives from utilitarian theories of justice and is therefore seen by many as an equity principle.  
Associated with each principle is a corresponding division of the good: for the bundle of 12 apples in 
vignette (a) of Figure 1, for example, equal division of the apples would allocate 6 apples to each of 
Smith and Jones; total benefit maximization would allocate all 12 apples to Jones, and equal benefit, 
relative need and maximin would each allocate 4 apples to Jones and 8 to Smith.  
We also indirectly test for a sixth principle similar in spirit to one that has variously been called a 
minimum, or “fixed floor,” principle (Elster 1992).   In our context, the minimum-floor principle argues 
that “a fair division gives at least something to each individual.”  Previous studies of the fair division of 
a fixed amount of single good between two individuals with differing productivities have at times 
confounded this minimum floor principle with maximization of total benefit.  Total benefit maximization 
among individuals of differing (linear) productivities requires that the more productive individual 
receive all of the good and the less productive individual receives nothing, making separate 
identification of these principles becomes impossible unless an individual maximum-benefit constraint 
is imposed beyond which further consumption confers no benefit to an individual.   For the apple 
vignettes we therefore test a distribution problem with no such constraint against an identical 
distribution problem with a maximum benefit constraint which ensures that even the total benefit-PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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maximizing division gives apples to each individual.
5
A change from quantitative to verbal descriptions may also generate broader effects on 
judgments.  The purely quantitative information on alternative divisions of the available supply of the 
good emphasizes end-state distributional equity, focusing solely on the final distribution of the good.  
In contrast, the purely verbal descriptions of the alternative equity principles to guide the division draw 
on notions of procedural equity, focusing on the principles and the associated processes that 
determine the distribution.  Procedural equity is premised on the notion that fair processes should 
generate fair outcomes.   The two types of information also appeal to different types of logic:  the 
verbal description of principles calls for deductive reasoning from the principles to the distribution they 
generate; the quantitative outcome information calls for inductive reasoning from quantities to 
   The constrained vignettes included the following 
additional information from that listed in vignette (a) presented in Figure 1:    
Both Jones and Smith are interested in the consumption of apples only insofar as such 
consumption provides vitamin F. The maximum amount of vitamin F that each 
individual’s body can absorb in a single day is 80 mg. All the other traits of the fruit 
(such as taste, calorie content, etc.) are of no consequence to them.  
 
As a result of this constraint, the total benefit maximizing division gives 8 apples to Jones and 4 apples 
to Smith rather than all 12 apples to Jones.  We identify the effect of the constraint using between-
subject variation: each respondent faced either only constrained (75% of respondents) or only 
unconstrained apple vignettes (25% of respondents).      
 
2.3 Description of Alternative Divisions of the Good   
We test the impact of three alternative ways to describe potential divisions to respondents: using only 
quantitative information regarding alternative divisions; using only verbal descriptions of alternative 
distributional principles; and using a combination of verbal descriptions of the principles and the 
associated quantitative allocations.   Three of the principles being examined — division according to 
relative need, division to equalize benefit, and maximin — generate the same quantitative allocation 
(that equalizes benefit across recipients).  In previous work on fair-division problems similar to ours  
(Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1993) and  Kahneman and Varey (1991)), more than three-quarters of those 
when presented with only quantitative descriptions chose the division that equalizes benefit across the 
recipients.  The vignettes that provide only verbal descriptions of the alternative equity principles 
provide insight into the reasoning, or equity principles, used by participants when choosing the equal-
benefit division.    
                                                 
5 Because the pain-relief pill vignettes include a natural maximum benefit constraint (once a person obtains 24 hours of pain 
relief, further consumption or pills provides no benefit), it is not possible to test for this effect with respect to the division of 
pills. HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
CHEPA WORKING PAPER 09-01 
principles.   Closely related to this, the two types of information present distinct cognitive challenges.  
The verbal information requires participants to infer distributions from principles; in many cases, a 
participant may not correctly infer the final distribution associated with a principle.  The quantitative-
only descriptions may challenge some participants’ ability to think clearly about the distributional 
problem given the widespread discomfort among general public with even basic arithmetic and the 
general public’s difficulties processing quantitative information (Paulos 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 
1988).      
The vignettes that present both the verbal descriptions of the alternative principles and the 
associated final allocations allow us to test which type of information dominates when making equity 
judgments:  when there is a discrepancy between judgments based solely on the process-oriented 
principles and those based on the end-state distributions, do subsequent judgments made when given 
both types of information adhere more closely to the principles or the final distributions?  
 
2.4   Most Fair and Least Fair Divisions 
All studies of fair distribution of which we are aware ask respondents only which division they judge to 
be “most fair” or “most just,” and assess support for each division based on a plurality voting rule that 
considers only the number of first-place votes each receives.  This ignores all other information on 
how participants rank the alternatives.  Although we felt that it would be too burdensome to ask 
participants to provide full rankings of the five principles, in addition to asking them which division they 
judge to be most-fair, we also asked them which division they judge to be least-fair.   
This additional information is useful in two ways.  It allows us to test whether the treatment 
effects we investigate have different impacts at the high and low ends of the rank distribution.  It also 
allows us to investigate the robustness of the plurality-based rankings to two alternative vote-scoring 
methods.   One is a negative voting rule that uses only the information on the least-fair division by 
assigning a value of 0 to the least-fair division and a value of 1 to all others (Cox 1987; Myerson 
2002).  The “winner” is the alternative that receives the smallest number of last-place votes.  A ranking 
based on such information may be of particular interest to risk-averse policymakers who often seek as 
much to avoid choices that engender strong negative reactions as to identify the potentially elusive 
choice that garners the most positive support.  It is also possible that even if there is no strong 
consensus on a single most-equitable alternative, there may be strong consensus on the least-
equitable.    
The second scoring rule is the Borda rule, which exploits information on the full ranking of 
alternatives and is one of the more commonly used alternative aggregation approaches when the 
number of choice options exceeds two (Mueller 1989).  Information on only the most- and least-fair 
divisions is not sufficient to fully rank allocations using the Borda method when there are five PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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alternatives, but under reasonable assumptions (given our observed pattern of ranking) it is sufficient 
to gain insight whether the Borda method would select a different alternative than the plurality method.    
 
2.5 Survey Design 
Our design results in 9 distinct vignettes: 3 pill-based vignettes (one for each information type); 3 
unconstrained apple vignettes; and 3 constrained apple vignettes.  The survey was based on a full 
factorial experimental design in which participants faced all treatments in controlled and varied 
sequential order allowing for both within- and between-subject comparisons.
6
We sampled a total of 560 individuals, 307 from the university and 253 from the community 
(Table 1).   As expected, the university and community samples differ along a number of dimensions:  
the university sample is younger and rates its health status higher on average than does the 
community sample; it also has a higher proportion of females.  The vast majority (82%) of the 
  Therefore, the survey 
presented each participant with a series of six vignettes; each vignette presented a single distribution 
problem.   For each vignette, participants were asked to indicate the division they judged to be most 
fair and the division they judged to be least fair.  For the quantitative-only vignettes participants were 
also allowed to write down a division other than those listed.  Hence, we obtained 12 judgments from 
each participant.  We controlled for possible order effects by randomizing in three ways:  whether a 
participant first saw an apple vignette or a pill vignette; whether they first made judgments under 
verbal-only information or quantitative-only information (the description with both types always came 
third); and the order in which choice options were listed in each vignette.  This randomization ensures 
that our findings are robust against both order effects in each of these dimensions and certain types of 
lazy, unreflective behavior such as simply choosing the first alternative listed.   
 
2.6  Survey Administration and Sample 
Subjects were recruited from a Canadian university (McMaster University) and its surrounding 
community (Hamilton, Ontario).  University subjects were recruited through a variety of means, 
including advertisements in the university newspaper and notices posted on the university web-site, in 
high-traffic commons areas, and introductory economics classes (none of which was taught by study 
researchers).   Community subjects were recruited through two means, local public libraries 
(approximately 15% of community sample) and local shopping malls (about 85%).  Subjects 
completed the survey on a computer terminal that automatically saved responses to a database.  All 
subjects provided informed consent and were paid a fixed fee for participating that did not depend in 
any way on their choices or on the choices of others in the experiment. The study was approved by 
the McMaster University Research Ethics Board. 
                                                 
6 Except, as noted, for the constrained vs. unconstrained analysis, which is based solely on between-subject comparisons. HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
CHEPA WORKING PAPER 09-01 
university sample is undergraduates, and a plurality comes from the faculties of science and 
engineering, followed by social science, business, humanities and health sciences. (Most university 
respondents have had either no economics training or at most introductory economics.)  The 
community sample achieved substantial variation in socio-economic status.  Comparison of our 
community sample against 2006 census data confirmed that the sample broadly corresponds to the 
population of Hamilton with respect to age, education level, parental status, and employment status; 
our sample includes a slightly larger proportion of renters than the general population and has a lower 
median income.   
 
2.7 Data Analysis 
We analyzed the responses in two ways.  The first was descriptive analyses using frequency 
distributions and cross-tabulations of subject responses.  Standard statistical tests on these cross-
tabulations (e.g., Chi-squared tests) are not valid, however, because repeated observations from each 
subject induces correlation among the observations, causing standard errors to be underestimated.   
To address this problem we also estimated multinomial-logit choice models that adjust for the lack of 
independence among repeated observations from each individual (Agresti 1996; Agresti 2002; Long 
and Freese 2006).  Through these models we formally tested for a good effect (pills vs. apples), an 
information effect (verbal description of principles vs. both verbal and quantitative information), two 
types of sample effects (university vs. community; male vs. female), a constraint effect (constrained 
vs. unconstrained), and for interactions among these dimensions of the distribution problems.    
The presentation of results below emphasizes the descriptive cross-tabulation that more 
readily convey relevant patterns in the data.   All references to statistical significance in the textual 
commentary on these cross-tabulations are based on the results of the multinomial-logit models.   Full 
results of the multinomial-logit models are presented in the Appendix.   
 
3.0 The Observed Equity Judgments  
Table 2 summarizes the equity judgments made by participants.  It presents the proportion of 
observations for which each equity principle was chosen as most-fair (panel A) and as least-fair (panel 
B).  For each panel, the rows correspond to a particular subset of the observations defined by the 
good, constraint, sample, and information used to describe the alternative divisions.  The columns 
correspond to the alternative equity principles.   We present separately results for the equal-benefit 
principle when listed in the quantitative-only vignettes, for which it was one of three choice options, 
and when listed in vignettes with verbal descriptions or both verbal and quantitative descriptions, for 
which it was one of five choice options.  In addition, for responses to vignettes with verbal descriptions 
or both verbal and quantitative information, we list the sum of responses for the three principles that 
lead to the identical quantitative division that produces equal benefit.  We discuss first the equity PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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judgments made when presented with only quantitative information. These compare most directly with 
previous research and serve as a baseline for subsequent examination of information effects.   
 
3.1 Judgments of equity when presented with quantitative information only 
Responses aggregated over goods and samples show that, when presented with only quantitative 
information, the division that provides equal benefit to each of the recipients is chosen as the most-fair 
division more than three-quarters of the time (78.4%) (Table 2, panel A-a).  Equal division is the next 
most frequently chosen allocation (15.1%), and total benefit maximization receives the least support 
(5.5%).   The preferences regarding the least-fair division (panel B-e) exactly reverse those for most-
fair:  total benefit maximization is judged to be least-fair in over 82% of responses, followed by equal 
division of the good (10.5%) and equal-benefit (7.1%).    
As in previous studies, when judging fairness the vast majority of respondents focus on the 
outcome space, not the goods space. The support for the equal-benefit division as most-fair is 
remarkably close to that observed by Yaari and Bar-Hillel more than 20 years ago in samples of Israeli 
students applying for admission to Hebrew University (Bar-Hillel and Yaari 1993; Yaari and Bar-Hillel 
1984) and by Kahneman and Varey (1991) in a sample from the United States.  In Yaari and Bar-
Hillel’s base scenario 82% of respondents chose the division that equalized benefit across recipients, 
with similar findings across a number of minor variations on this base scenario (see Table 1, Bar-Hillel 
and Yaari 1993); Kahneman and Varey (1991) found that 77% of their respondents chose the division 
of pills that equalized pain relief between two individuals.  The congruence of support across three 
cultures and two decades is remarkable.     
A comparison of responses for apples and pills reveals statistically significant, but modest 
differences across the two goods (panels A-b, B-f).   The equal-benefit division is the dominant choice 
as most-fair for both apples and pills, but support is slightly higher for pills than for apples (83.2% vs. 
73.6%).  This greater support for the equal-benefit division when allocating pills is associated with less 
support for equal division (10.9% vs.19.5%).  A corresponding pattern is present for judgments of the 
least-fair division:  support for equal division as the least-fair is slightly higher for pills than for apples 
(12.7% vs. 8.4%).   For both the most-fair and least-fair judgments, the modest differences in the 
patterns of choices across the goods are consistent with a distinct view of health care.  The choices 
for pills exhibit a stronger link between equity judgments and both the amount and the distribution of 
benefits than do the choices for apples.  This is as one might expect:  as a non-health care good, 
apples are not traditionally of particular equity concern, making their equal division more plausible as 
the most-fair division.  
When we break the apples responses down further to test for the “minimum floor” principle by 
comparing responses with an individual-level benefit constraint against those without a constraint, we HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
CHEPA WORKING PAPER 09-01 
observe the expected effect.  For judgments of the most-fair division the proportion of respondents 
who chose total benefit maximization is more than twice as large (7.1% vs. 3.0%) for the constrained 
vignette in which both individuals receive some apples than it is for the unconstrained vignette in 
which one individual gets all of the apples and the other gets none.  Similarly, respondents are more 
likely to choose total benefit maximization as the least-fair for the unconstrained vignettes than for the 
constrained vignettes (86.6% vs. 82.8%).   In each case the absolute difference between the 
proportions is about 4%, which, while not large in absolute terms, is a large proportion of the possible 
difference given the baseline level of support for total benefit maximization.   We also observe a large, 
unanticipated effect of the maximum benefit constraint on the support for dividing the goods equally.  
Imposing the benefit constraint causes support for equal division as the most-fair to fall from 30.4% to 
15.8% and support for equal division as the least-fair to increase from 5.9% to 9.2%.   The benefit 
constraint may focus greater attention on the outcomes space, causing respondents to shift away from 
equal division, which focuses solely on the goods space. 
The distribution of responses for the constrained apple vignettes more closely approximates 
the response-distribution for pills than does response distribution for the unconstrained apple 
vignettes.  This is as one might expect – as noted, the pill vignettes have an inherent benefit constraint 
because of the limited length of a day.   In fact, comparison of responses to pill vignettes and only the 
apple responses for the constrained vignettes reveals a small, non-significant difference in the 
distributions, demonstrating the importance of controlling explicitly for the minimum-floor principle 
when allocating a good between individuals of differing productivities.   
We also observe statistically significant differences in equity judgment across the university 
and community sample, though again the differences are modest and in no instances do the rankings 
differ between the two samples (panels A-c, B-g).   Respondents from the university sample are more 
likely to rank equal benefit as the most-fair division (83.2% vs. 72.5%), with most of this higher level of 
support coming from total benefit maximization (2.0% vs. 9.9%).   Similarly, the university respondents 
are more likely to rank total benefit maximization as least fair (90.1% vs. 72.1%), with this higher level 
of support coming from both equal division and equal benefit.   The university respondents focus more 
on distribution within the outcomes space than do community respondents. 
Because the university sample has a higher proportion of females than does the community 
sample, and previous research suggests that in general females have more egalitarian attitudes than 
males (Konow 2003), we tested whether this sample effect might be a spurious relationship arising 
from the different proportions of females in the samples.  Indeed, a sex effect is present (panel A-d; 
panel b-h)):  females are more likely to choose the equal-benefit division a most-fair (84.4% vs. 
72.5%) and less likely to choose it as least-fair (4.0% vs. 10.1%).   Even after controlling for sex, 
however, a significant university-community effect of similar magnitude to that noted above remains. PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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In summary, the equity judgments made when presented with only quantitative information on 
alternative divisions confirm previous finding of strong support for the division that equalizes benefit 
across recipients, exhibit modest good effects in the expected direction between pill and apples, 
modest sample effects, and the expected effect of imposing a maximum benefit constraint.  In none of 
the cases, however, do the differences observed challenge the basic conclusion that the division that 
equalizes benefit across recipients is the dominant choice as most-fair and benefit maximization is the 
dominant choice as least-fair.
7
3.2  Comparing Equity Judgments: Verbal Descriptions of Equity Principles versus 
Quantitative Information Only  
   
 
The choice distributions for vignettes in which alternative allocation principles are described verbally 
include all five equity principles.  Starting again with the distribution of equity judgments aggregated 
across goods and samples, a number of effects are notable.  Relative need is chosen most frequently 
as the most-fair principle (42.7%), followed by the principle of division to provide equal benefit to each 
recipient (26.0%), maximin (11.6%), total benefit maximization (12.1%), and finally, equal division of 
the good (7.7%) (panel A-a).  The distribution of least-fair judgments again exactly reverses that of 
most-fair judgments with relative need garnering the smallest support as least-fair (5.4%) and equal 
division the largest support (45.4%) (panel B-e).   Among the three principles that lead to the same 
quantitative division, therefore, the principle of relative need — which calls explicitly for using the 
limited supply of a good to respond proportionally to each individual’s needs — dominates both equal-
benefit and Rawlsian maximin.    
The sum of most-fair responses for these three principles very nearly equals the support of the 
equal-benefit division with only quantitative information (80.3% vs. 78.4%).   Over 86% of respondents 
who chose the quantitative equal-benefit division also chose one of the three principles that map into 
it.   This correspondence breaks down, however, for judgments of the least-fair division:  the sum of 
support for equal benefit, relative need and maximin as least-fair is four times that of the quantitative 
equal-benefit division (27.7% vs. 7.1%); and for least-fair judgments, only 48% of those who chose the 
quantitative equal-benefit division also chose one of the three verbal principles that correspond to this 
division.  Judgments of least-fair display less consensus when presented with verbal information only 
than those based on quantitative information only.  While over 82% choose total benefit maximization 
as least-fair when presented with quantitative information only, no option receives even majority 
support as least-fair when presented with only verbal descriptions of the principles. 
                                                 
7 Tests for interaction effect between good and sample revealed only weak interaction effects, none of which modify the 
conclusions from the simpler models, i.e. the good effect was the same in both the university and the community sample and 
vice-versa.  See the results presented in the Appendix. HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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  The support for total benefit maximization and equal division differs substantially when 
presented with verbal descriptions instead of the quantitative divisions.  More than twice as many 
respondents judge total benefit maximization as most fair when provided with only verbal descriptions 
of the allocation principles (12.1% vs. 5.5%) and, even more dramatically, less than one-third as many 
choose it as least-fair when presented with verbal information only rather than quantitative information 
(26.9% vs. 82.4%).   Correspondingly, less than half as many respondents choose equal division as 
most fair when presented with verbal information only rather than the quantitative information (7.7% 
vs. 15.1%) while more than four times as many choose it as least fair (45.4% vs. 10.5%).   The overall 
patterns of differences between judgments made with verbal only and quantitative-only information 
imply that respondents focus more on the outcomes space when presented with the verbal 
descriptions, perhaps because the verbal descriptions emphasize more explicitly the relationship 
between the alternatives and potential benefit.   
  Disaggregating the responses by apples and pills again reveals modest, though statistically 
significant good effects (panels A-b, B-f).  Compared to apples, for the division of pills respondents are 
more likely to choose as most-fair total benefit maximization (14.3% vs. 9.8%) and equal benefit 
(29.1% vs. 22.9%), and less likely to choose equal division (4.5% vs. 10.9%).  This repeats the pattern 
observed for quantitative-only vignettes in which benefit-related principles receive more support as 
most-fair for pills than for apples.  For judgments of the least-fair division, the good effect is 
concentrated on equal division and maximin; in this case the greater support for equal division as the 
least-fair allocation for pills compared to apples (49.5% vs. 41.4%) is associated with a lower level of 
support for maximin as the least-fair for pills (12.9% vs. 19.1%).  The ranking of the two divisions that 
are directly comparable between the quantitative and verbal vignettes — total benefit maximization 
and equal division — differ for the two types of information.  When presented with quantitative 
information only, for both apples and pills total benefit maximization is ranked last as most-fair and 
equal division is ranked second last; for verbal information only, however, total benefit maximization is 
ranked last for apples but equal division is ranked last for pills.  No such reversal occurs for judgments 
of the least-fair division.  
Disaggregating response by university and community respondents reveals modest, 
statistically significant sample effects.  University respondents are less likely to choose total benefit 
maximization as the most-fair (10.6% vs. 13.8%), less likely to choose maximin (9.3% vs. 14.4%), and 
more likely to choose equal benefit (30.1% vs. 21.0%).  Relative need is most-frequently chosen in 
both sub-samples. For judgments of the least-fair division (Panel 2B, g), university respondents are 
correspondingly more likely to choose total benefit maximization as the least-fair (33.6% vs. 18.8%) 
and less likely to choose equal benefit (3.3% vs. 10.1%), and again the rank of these two is the same 
across the two subsamples.   Equal division is chosen least-often as most-fair and most-often as least-
fair by both the university and community respondents.  We do observe some differences in rankings PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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between the community and university samples lower down in the distribution — total benefit 
maximization is ranked ahead of maximin among university respondents while the opposite is true for 
community respondents — but these rank differences are driven by small differences in the proportion 
of respondents choosing each of them.   
Surprisingly, when respondents are presented with only verbal information we observe no 
statistically significant effect of sex on judgments of the most-fair division.  The percentage of males 
and females choosing each of total benefit maximization or equal divisions differ by less than 1% 
(12.4% vs. 11.7% and 7.3% vs. 8.1%, and although there is some variation across males and females 
for each of maximin, equal-benefit and relative need, the sum across them differs by only 2% between 
males and females (82.3% vs. 80.3%).   A sex effect is present for the least-fair judgments, but it is 
different from the pattern observed with quantitative information only.  Now females are actually less 
likely than males to choose total benefit maximization as least-fair (25.2% vs. 28.6%) and more likely 
to choose equal division (49.1% vs. 41.8%).  
The important findings that emerge from these verbal-only vignettes are the strong, very stable 
support for relative need as the most-fair allocation principle, with maximin receiving the least support 
among those that lead to the same quantitative division; the greater support (compared to the 
quantitative-only vignettes) for total benefit maximization as most-fair (and correspondingly lesser 
support as least-fair); the changed impact of sex on equity judgments; and the weaker consensus on 
the least-fair distribution.
8
The distribution of choices made with both types of information correspond more closely to those 
based on only quantitative information than those based on only verbal information.  For example, 
support for total benefit maximization as most-fair is 4.3% when described using both types of 
information, 5.5% when described using quantitative information only, and 12.1% when using verbal 
information only; similarly, support for total benefit maximization as least-fair is 72.0% when described 
using both types of information, 82.4% when described using quantitative information only and 26.9% 
when using verbal only.  The support for equal division when respondents were given both types of 
information consistently falls between the support when given quantitative only and that when given 
verbal only, but especially for least-fair judgments, it lies closer to the results for quantitative- only 
vignettes.  When presented with both types of information, a higher proportion of those who chose the 
   
 
3.3 Equity Judgments with Both Verbal and Quantitative Information     
                                                 
8Tests for interaction effect between good and sample revealed no statistically significant interaction effects among the 
most-fair responses and only weak ones among least-fair response, none of which modify the conclusions from the simpler 
models  See the results presented in the Appendix. 
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quantitative equal-benefit division also chose one of the three principles that map into this division 
than when presented with verbal information only.   
The quantitative information dominates the verbal descriptions of the underlying principles.  
This may happen for two reasons:  first, the quantitative information is less abstract and perhaps 
easier to understand; second, the focus of the quantitative information on the end-state allocations 
matches better the nature of the allocation problem, which more naturally calls for end-state 
distributional judgments rather than procedural judgments.   
Comparison of the choice distributions for verbal-only and “both” reveals two patterns of note:  
the information effect is smallest for the relative-need and equal-benefit divisions for judgments of both 
the most-fair and least-fair division; and support for maximin as most-fair is consistently higher (and 
support as least-fair consistently lower) when it is described using both verbal and quantitative 
information rather than just verbal information. This may arise because maximin is perhaps the least 
intuitive of the principles, so the addition of quantitative information reassures people that it does not 
lead to an unacceptable allocation.
9
Focusing first on the quantitative-only vignettes (panel A-i), it is no surprise given the results 
presented already using the plurality rule that the aggregate ranking is invariant to the scoring rule 
used:  equal benefit ranks first, equal division second and total benefit maximization third.   For the 
verbal-only vignettes, the aggregate ranking of relative need and equal benefit divisions as first and 
second is invariant to whether the plurality or the negative scoring rule is employed; equal division 
ranks last in all but one case for which it ranks second last. The most frequent rank differences 
between the plurality and negative scoring rules occur for maximin and total benefit maximization, in 
which they trade the 3
rd and 4
th ranks in the overall analysis, the analysis of the fair division of pills and 
 
 
3.4 Aggregate Rankings under Alternative Vote-scoring Methods 
Table 3 lists the resulting aggregate rankings of the alternative divisions under the three vote-scoring 
methods examined: plurality rule (on which we have been focusing until now), negative scoring, and 
Borda scoring.    Panel A of the table presents the results for all three scoring rules for the 
quantitative-only vignettes for which there are only three divisions and we can completely rank them 
using the most-fair and least-fair responses, and the plurality and negative scoring rules for verbal only 
and both verbal and quantitative information.  The Borda analysis for the verbal only and “both” 
judgments appears in panel B and is limited to a consideration of the two most highly ranked 
alternatives under the plurality rule, equal benefit and relative need.  We discuss our approach to this 
in more detail below. 
                                                 
9 Again, tests for interaction effect between good and sample revealed no statistically significant interaction effects among 
the most-fair responses and only weak ones among least-fair response, none of which modify the conclusions from the 
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in the university sample.  All of these rank changes are driven by the plurality scoring rule.  When both 
quantitative and verbal information are presented, once again the aggregate rankings are invariant to 
the scoring method:  relative need and equal benefit rank first and second; maximin third, equal 
division fourth and total benefit maximization now ranks last in all cases.    When quantitative 
information is presented (either solely or in combination with verbal information), therefore, the 
aggregate rankings are invariant to the scoring methods used and total benefit maximization always 
ranks last.  The aggregate rankings are more stable under the negative scoring rule than under the 
plurality rule:  no differences occur across goods or samples under the negative scoring rule    
Because we cannot fully rank the five divisions using the Borda scoring rule, the analysis of the 
Borda rule for verbal information and both verbal and quantitative information focuses on relative need 
and equal benefit, which always ranked first and second under the plurality and negative scoring rules 
(Table 3, panel B).  Under the Borda scoring rule, the relative aggregate ranking of the relative-need 
and equal-benefit divisions depends only on the sum across observations of the difference in rank 
between the two.  We know this difference exactly when the two make up the most-fair/least-fair pair, 
and we have two types of partial information: when one of them is ranked as most-fair or least-fair, we 
know its relative ranking, but we do not know the exact difference in rank between them; when neither 
was chosen as most-fair or least-fair, we know neither the relative rank nor the exact difference in 
rank, only that they both fall in positions 2, 3 or 4.   We examine three cases that make differing 
assumptions about the difference in ranks when unknown.  First, the best-case scenario for relative 
need:  whenever we do not know the exact difference in ranks, assume it is the maximum difference 
possible in favor of relative need.  Second, the best-case scenario for equal benefit in which we 
assume the opposite:  that the difference in rank is always to the maximum possible advantage to the 
equal benefit alternative.  Finally, we examine a middle case in which the probability of observing a 
given distance in rank between the two decreases with the magnitude of the difference.
10
As expected, under the best-case scenario for relative need, it ranks above equal benefit in all 
cases; for the  best-case scenario for equal-benefit, relative need always ranks second to equal-
benefit.  In many cases, however, the Borda scores differ by only a small amount, so relatively minor 
changes in rankings can reverse the difference.  For the middle case the Borda rank reverses in a 
minority of the cases across information types, samples and goods.  For the division of pills, for 
example, the two alternatives would rank differently in the community and university samples; the 
alternatives rank differently across information sets within each sample; and the alternatives rank 
differently across pills and apples within the university sample when verbal information only is 
      
                                                 
10Given that the two principles receive the most support overall, that are closely related conceptually, and that in every 
instance when one was chosen as most-fair, the other was least-often chosen as the least-fair, when we know only the 
relative rank we assume that there is a 75% chance that the ranks differ by only 1, a 15% chance that they differ by 2, and a 
10% chance that they differ by 3.  In the small proportion of observations in which we do not know either the relative 
ranking or distance, we assume even chances that each ranks above the other.   HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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provided and within the community sample when both verbal and quantitative information are 
presented.    These calculations are only illustrative, but while the overall picture is one of 
considerable stability of aggregate rankings among alternative scoring rules, under plausible 
conditions the rankings sometimes differ between the plurality scoring and Borda scoring, highlighting 
the potential value of collecting additional information beyond simply that of the most-preferred 
alternative.   
 
4.0 Discussion   
This study re-affirms some findings from previous research regarding fairness in distribution and 
introduces evidence on a number of aspects of fair division not previously studied.  It re-affirms that 
when presented with alternative quantitative allocations of a fixed supply of a good that is differentially 
needed by recipients, the vast majority of respondents choose as most-fair the division that equalizes 
benefit across recipients. Indeed, the concordance between our findings from Canada in 2007, those 
of Yaari and Bar-Hillel from Israel from as far back as the late 1970s, and Kahneman and Varey from 
the United States in the late 1980s is remarkable given the potential cultural differences among 
respondents.  Our findings for the vignettes with only verbal descriptions of alternative distributional 
principles show further that this judgment is most often motivated by the desire to respond 
proportionately to the differing needs of recipients than by explicit appeal to equality of benefit.   The 
consistent high level of support for the principle of allocation according to relative need as most-fair 
stands out: across goods, information types, and samples, its support (with one exception), always fell 
between 40% and 44%.   
Equal division and total benefit maximization are consistently judged as less fair than any of the 
principles that focus on the distribution of benefit (equal benefit, need-based, maximin).  Total benefit 
maximization ignores distributional effects, and, as noted earlier, is more properly seen as an 
efficiency criterion.  In a non-production context where there is no trade-off between the size of the pie 
and its distribution, the negative distributional consequences of maximizing benefit are more salient.  
Equal division focuses on goods per se and not the benefits associated with the allocation of the 
goods.   In need-related settings, attention shifts from the goods themselves to the benefits they 
generate.        
The modest differences in equity judgments that we observe between pills — the explicit health 
care good — and apples — the health-affecting non-health-care-good — are consistent with our 
hypothesis that some people see health care as distinct, even from a non-health-care good that 
produces a health benefit. The benefit-related divisions as a group receive more support as most-fair 
for pills than apples. But the overall pattern across the two goods is that both goods were valued 
instrumentally for their impact on health.  Our design strove to present two goods as identically as 
possible except that one was health care and one was not, so that they would differ only in this one PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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dimension.   Debriefing interviews with subjects indicate that we may not have been as successful in 
this as we hoped.  At least some of the respondents focused on other aspects of the two goods.  
Although both goods produce health benefits, some perceived them as different types of health 
benefits: pills represented a curative service that produced immediate gain while the apples’ vitamin 
provided a preventive health benefit; some respondents saw pain relief as more serious than a vitamin 
deficiency.    In the end, it is unclear the extent to which the differences between the two goods on 
which we wanted them to focus were the most salient aspects of the goods. 
Our findings lend further credence to reasonableness of basing this and similar types of research 
on convenient, university-based samples.  Although differences between the university and community 
samples were statistically significant, they were generally modest and would not alter any fundamental 
conclusions regarding equity judgments of fair division.  This may derive in part because our university 
sample drew from across the university, with representation from all Faculties of study and from both 
students and staff.  The lack of meaningful difference between the two samples may not extend to 
samples drawn from single disciplines (such as economics).  But our results do imply that convenient, 
university-based samples can generalize beyond the campus.       
Perhaps our most important findings are those of the impact on equity judgments of verbal 
descriptions of equity principles compared to quantitative information.  Although we varied this 
primarily to identify the underlying equity reasoning that motivated choice of equal-benefit distributions 
when presented with quantitative information only, the different information had a broader impact on 
equity judgments.  Support for total benefit maximization as most-fair is substantially higher for 
vignettes that presented only verbal descriptions of distributional principles than when presented only 
quantitative distributions.  Support of maximin is consistently higher when both verbal and quantitative 
information is provided than when only verbal descriptions are presented.   Consensus on the most- 
and least-fair distributions is lower when presented with only verbal descriptions than with quantitative 
information.  These types of information effects also differ across different parts of the rank 
distribution: their effect is more pronounced among judgments of the least-fair division than the most-
fair.  And we observe a strong sex-information interaction, with strong sex effects when presented with 
quantitative information but no sex effect (in the case of most-fair judgments) or a different sex effect 
(in the case of least-fair judgments) when presented with only verbal descriptions.   This raises the 
possibility that some of the sex effects documented in previous research on fair division, which has 
generally presented only quantitative information, may not hold more generally.  In any event, this 
finding deserves further investigation.  The only other study of which we are aware that has examined 
these types of informational effects in studies of fair division (Schokkaert et al. 2007) also found large 
differences between responses to verbal and quantitative information, but the different foci of that 
study and ours do not allow comparison of the specific findings of each.   HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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An obvious question is why such differences arise.  Although for short-hand we call them 
simply “verbal” and “quantitative”, the two methods of description differ in a number of ways beyond 
simply the use of words vs. numbers:  the verbal description of an allocation principle is more abstract 
than is a concrete listing of how much of the good each recipient receives;  the verbal description of a 
principle calls for a more deductive style of reasoning, while the actual distribution calls, if anything, for 
a induction from a concrete , numeric distribution back to principles; and, as noted, the verbal 
description of a principle emphasizes procedural equity while the quantitative outcomes emphasize 
end-state distribution.  The fact that the judgments made when given both verbal and quantitative 
information align more closely with those made when given only quantitative information suggests that 
differences between the verbal only vignettes and those that included quantitative information likely 
arise because some individuals do not understand the distributional implications of the various 
principles.  That is, they chose a principle that has intuitive appeal as a notion of fairness without 
appreciating the division implied by application of the principle.  Our study was not designed to test 
this, but the data do allow us to gain some insight into this issue.  Respondents faced two sets of 
judgments, one for apples and one for pills.  During the first set, they made equity judgments for 
quantitative-only and verbal-only vignettes before they saw the vignette that provided both types of 
information, thereby revealing the correspondence between principles and quantitative divisions.   
When they made the second set of judgments, therefore, they had been made aware of the 
relationship between the principles and the quantitative divisions.  If they had not initially understood 
this relationship, their second set of responses should exhibit more agreement between the 
quantitative-only vignettes and the verbal-only vignettes.  Because we randomized the order of the two 
goods, we do not need to worry about confounding between the second set of choices and the good.  
Our results are consistent with learning:  there is more agreement between the choices made with 
quantitative only information and verbal-only information in the second set of responses than in the 
first set.  This is especially true for total benefit maximization (e.g., there is less than 10% agreement 
on the first set of responses but approximately 40% agreement on the second set of responses).  We 
also observe a greater degree of agreement between choosing equal-benefit in the quantitative-only 
vignettes and choosing one of the three principles consistent with this allocation.   These conclusions 
are tentative given that this study was not designed to test this hypothesis, but this should be 
examined in future research.      
These findings regarding the impact of information have both methodological and policy 
implications.  When multiple principles of division generate the same quantitative allocation, gaining 
insight into the principles and logic that underlie respondents’ choices can be valuable both because it 
can inform a broader understanding of equity-based reasoning and because the principles may not 
always align with the same quantitative division, e.g., maxmin and equal benefit will not lead to the 
same allocation if people start differing baseline levels of welfare.   Although it will often be possible to PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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manipulate scenarios appropriately to distinguish such principles, when this is not possible 
researchers can test the principle directly through, for example, verbal descriptions as we have done.  
But our results suggest that responses to vignettes that provide only verbal descriptions of equity 
principles may be less reliable, and that more trust can be placed in vignettes that include both verbal 
and quantitative descriptions.    
The findings also imply a potential paradox for policy.  Policies that have important 
distributional effects are generally articulated and justified by appeal to equity principles.  That is, they 
are generally “sold” to the public by appeal to general principles (the tax burden will be shared in 
proportion to one’s ability-to-pay, payment will vary in accord with the benefits received, health care 
will be allocated according to need; etc.).   So support for implementation is based on the kinds of 
information presented in the verbal descriptions.   But the effects are measured and documented in 
quantitative terms, much like the information presented in the quantitative-only vignettes.    People’s 
(apparent) inability to appreciate the quantitative implications of alternative distributional principles 
may lead to a systematic discord between the policies they support in principle and those that they 
would support when faced with the results of a successfully implemented policy that achieved exactly 
what was proposed.   The contentiousness of distributional policies may derive not just from differing 
conceptions of equity across individuals; it may also arise from the different judgments an individual 
makes when presented with different kinds of information.      HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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Figure 1:  Two Sample Vignettes  
(a) Vignette 1:  Apples, Unconstrained, Quantitative Information only 
A bag of twelve apples is to be distributed between Jones and Smith.  The following information is given, and is 
known also to both Jones and Smith:      
•  Jones and Smith are identical in all respects except how well their bodies metabolize apples.   
•  Doctors have determined that Jones’s metabolism is such that his body derives 10 milligrams of vitamin 
F from each apple consumed.   
•  Doctors have also determined that Smith's metabolism is such that his body derives 5 milligrams of 
vitamin F from each apple consumed.  
•  Both Jones and Smith are interested in the consumption of apples only insofar as such consumption 
provides vitamin F - and the more vitamin F the better. All the other traits of the fruit (such as taste, 
calorie content, etc.) are of no consequence to them.  
•  After the apples are divided between them, Jones and Smith will not be able to trade apples between 
themselves or transfer apples to a third person.  
 
The apples are to be divided between Jones and Smith. As a third-party, you are asked to decide how to 
divide the apples between Jones and Smith. Below we list some possible ways to divide the apples. 
 
(a)  Jones:   6 apples (yielding 60 mg of vitamin F)  
       Smith:   6 apples (yielding 30 mg of vitamin F)  
 
(b)  Jones:  12 apples (yielding 120 mg of vitamin F) 
       Smith:   0 apples (yielding 0 mg of vitamin F) 
 
(c)  Jones:    4 apples (yielding 40 mg of vitamin F)                  
      Smith:    8 apples (yielding 40 mg of vitamin F) 
(d)  other 
What do you judge to be the fairest division of the apples? Please choose one of the above allocations 
((a)-(c)) or choose (d) and specify a different allocation of the apples.   
What do you judge to be the least fair
•  Doctors have determined that Williams's metabolism is such that one pill gives him two hours of pain 
relief.   
 division of the apples among the listed above allocations? Please 
choose one of the above allocations ((a)-(c)) . 
 
(b) Vignette 2:  Pain-relief Pills, Verbal Information only  
A limited supply of pain relief medication is to be distributed between Williams and Taylor, both of whom suffer 
from a painful disease. This pain medication can provide total relief from the pain.  The following information is 
given, and is known also to both Williams and Taylor:  
•  Doctors have also determined that Taylor's metabolism is such that one pill gives him one hour of pain 
relief.   
•  Williams and Taylor are identical in all respects except their metabolism.  
•  After the pills are divided between them, Williams and Taylor can not trade the pills between themselves 
or transfer the pills to a third person.  
 
The pills are to be divided between Williams and Taylor and Smith. As a third-party, you are asked to 
decide how to divide the pills between Williams and Taylor. Below we list some possible ways to divide 
the pills. 
  
(a) Divide the pills in such a way that the total number of hours of pain relief obtained by both Williams and 
Taylor is as large as possible. 
(b) Divide the pills in such a way that Williams, whose body is less able to derive pain relief from the pills, 
receives at least as much pain relief as Taylor.  
(c) Divide the pills in such a way that Williams and Taylor each receive the same amount of pain relief.  
(d) Divide the pills in such a way that Williams and Taylor each get the same number of pills. 
(e) Divide the pills in such a way that Williams's and Taylor's needs for pain relief are met equally. 
 HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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What do you judge to be the fairest
What do you judge to be the 




 division of the pills? Please choose one of the above allocations 
((a)-(e)).   
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics:  University and Community Samples 
 
  University  Community  All 
Sample Size       307 (54.8%)      253 (45.2%)          560 (100%) 
Female (%)  185 (60.3%)        93 (36.8%)          278 (49.6%) 
Mean age      21.7 (sd = 5.8)     41.4 (sd=16.5)         30.6 (sd=15.4) 
Self-assessed Health Status 
   Poor           4   (1.3%)        13 (5.1%)           17  (3.0%) 
   Fair        12   (3.9%)        32 (12.6%)           44  (7.9%) 
   Good        85 (27.7%)        82 (32.4%)         167 (29.8%) 
   Very Good      141 (45.9%)        80 (31.6%)          221 (39.5%) 
   Excellent         65 (21.2%)        46 (18.2%)          111 (19.8%) 
McMaster Respondents 
  University Status          
   Undergraduate      253 (82.4%)     
   Graduate        30   (9.8%)     
   Staff        17   (5.5%)     
   Other          7   (2.3%)     
  Faculty  
   Science / Eng      144 (46.9%)     
   Social Science        52 (16.9%)     
   Business        41 (13.4%)     
   Humanities        25   (8.1%)     
   Health Sci        21   (6.8%)     
   Other        24   (7.8%)     
Community Respondents 
  Dwelling Type 
   Rent Home    135 (55.0%)   
  Own Home    114 (45.0%)   
  Parental Status 
   Parent – Yes    125 (49.4%)   
   Parent – No    128 (50.6%)   
 Education Level 
   < Secondary School    38 (15.0%)   
   Secondary Graduate    104 (41.1%)   
    Post-secondary  Graduate    111 (43.9%)   
 Income 
   No Income    11 (4.3%)   
   Less than $20,000    83 (32.8%)   
   $20K to $49,999    82 (32.4%)   
   $50K to $99,999    58 (22.9%)   
   $100K or more    19 (7.5%)   
 Employment Over Last 12 Months 
   No    81 (32.0%)   
   Yes    172 (68.0%)   
 Ever Health Sector Worker 
   No    202 (79.8%)   
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Sum        





  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)     
(A) MOST FAIR                  
  (a) Aggregated                       
        Quantitative        5.5%     15.1%  –  –  –  78.4%    1.0% 
        Verbal       12.1%       7.7%      11.6%     42.7%       26.0%  –  80.3%   
        Both        4.3%     11.3%      17.1%     41.0%       26.3%  –  84.5%   
  (b) By Good                 
       Quantitative                 
          Apples         6.1%     19.3%  –  –  –  73.6%    1.1% 
             No Constraint       3.0%     30.4%  –  –  –  65.2%    1.5% 
             Constraint        7.1%     15.8%  –  –  –  76.2%    0.9% 
          Pills         5.0%     10.9%  –  –  –  83.2%    0.9% 
       Verbal Only                 
          Apples         9.8%     10.9%     12.9%     43.6%       22.9%  –  79.3%   
          Pills       14.3%       4.5%     10.4%     41.8%       29.1%  –  81.3%   
       Both                 
          Apples         4.3%     15.4%     14.8%     40.9%       24.6%  –  80.4%   
          Pills         4.3%       7.1%     19.5%     41.1%       28.0%  –  88.6%   
 (c)  By Sample                 
       Quantitative                 
          University          2.0%      14.0%  –  –  –  83.2%    0.8% 
          Community        9.9%      16.4%  –  –  –  72.5%    1.2% 
       Verbal Only                 
          University        10.6%        8.0%       9.3%     42.0%       30.1%  –  81.4%   
          Community      13.8%        7.3%     14.4%     43.5%       21.0%  –  78.9%   
       Both                 
          University          2.1%      11.6%     16.3%     43.8%       26.2%  –  86.3%   
          Community        6.9%      10.9%     18.2%     37.6%       26.5%  –  82.2%   
 (d)  By Sex                 
       Quantitative                 
          Male          7.6%      18.6%  –  –  –  72.5%    1.2% 
          Female        3.4%      11.5%  –  –  –  83.4%    0.7% 
       Verbal Only                 
          Male        12.4%        7.3%      13.1%     40.4%       26.8%  –  82.3%   
          Female      11.7%        8.1%     10.1%     45.0%       25.2%  –  80.3%   
       Both                 
          Male          4.3%      12.8%     16.1%     38.3%       28.5%  –  82.9%   HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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          Female        4.3%        9.7%     18.1%     43.7%       24.1%  –  85.9%   
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  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)     
(B) LEAST FAIR                  
  (d) Aggregated                       
        Quantitative       82.4%     10.5%  –  –  –   7.1%    0.0% 
        Verbal        26.9%     45.4%      16.0%      5.4%        6.3%  –  27.7%   
        Both       72.0%     13.3%        7.3%      3.0%        4.3%  –  14.7%   
  (e) By Good                 
       Quantitative                 
          Apples        83.8%      8.4%  –  –  –   7.9%    0.0% 
             No Constraint       86.7%      5.9%  –  –  –   7.4%    0.0% 
             Constraint       82.8%      9.2%  –  –  –   8.0%    0.0% 
          Pills        81.1%     12.7%  –  –  –   6.3%    0.0% 
       Verbal Only                 
          Apples        28.6%     41.4%     19.1%      5.2%        5.7%  –  30.0%   
          Pills        25.2%     49.5%     12.9%      5.5%        7.0%  –  25.4%   
       Both                 
          Apples        78.6%       9.3%      5.9%      3.0%        3.2%  –  12.1%   
          Pills        65.4%     17.3%      8.8%      3.0%        5.5%  –  17.3%   
  (f)  By Sample                 
       Quantitative                 
          University         90.1%        6.5%  –  –  –   2.6%    0.0% 
          Community       72.1%      15.4%  –  –  –  12.5%    0.0% 
       Verbal Only                 
          University        33.6%       43.7%      16.6%      2.9%        3.3%  –  22.8%   
          Community      18.8%       47.6%      15.2%      8.3%       10.1%  –  33.6%   
       Both                 
          University         79.2%      11.2%      5.1%      2.9%        3.3%  –  11.3%   
          Community       63.2%      15.8%     10.1%      5.3%        5.5%  –  20.9%   
 (d)  By Sex                 
       Quantitative                 
          Male         77.5%      12.4%  –  –  –  10.1%     
          Female       87.4%        8.6%  –  –  –   4.0%     
       Verbal Only                 
          Male        28.6%       41.8%     14.9%      6.2%        8.5%  –  29.6%   
          Female      25.2%       49.1%     17.1%      4.5%        4.1%  –  25.7%   
       Both                 HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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          Male         69.2%      11.9%       9.0%      3.7%        6.2%  –  18.9%   
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Table 3:  Comparison of Alternative Vote-scoring Methods 
                               
Panel (A)  Overall    Apples    Pills    University Sample    Community 
Sample 
  Plural  Neg  Bord
a 
  Plural  Neg  Borda    Plural  Neg  Borda     Plural  Neg  Borda    Plural  Neg  Borda 
(i) Quantitative Information Only                         
Equal 
Division 
2  2  2    2  2  2    2  2  2    2  2  2    2  2  2 
Equal Benefit  1  1  1    1  1  1    1  1  1    1  1  1    1  1  1 
Benefit Max  3  3  3    3  3  3    3  3  3    3  3  3    3  3  3 
                                       
(ii) Verbal Information Only                           
Equal 
Division 
5  5      4  5      5  5      5  5      5  5   
Equal Benefit  2  2      2  2      2  2      2  2      2  2   
Benefit Max  4  3      3  3      4  3      4  3      3  3   
Relative 
Need 
1  1      1  1      1  1      1  1      1  1   
Maximin  3  4      5  4      3  4      3  4      4  4   
                                       
(iii) Both Verbal & 
Quantitative   
                         
Equal 
Division 
4  4      4  4      4  4      4  4      4  4   
Equal Benefit  2  2      2  2      2  2      2  2      2  2   
Benefit Max  3  3      3  3      3  3      3  3      3  3   
Relative 
Need 
1  1      1  1      1  1      1  1      1  1   
Maximin  5  5      5  5      5  5      5  5      5  5   
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Table 3 cont’d: Comparison of Alternative Vote-scoring Methods 
  
Panel (B)      University Sample            Community 
Sample 
   
    Apples        Pills        Apples        Pills   
















































(i) Verbal Information                        
Equal Benefit  2  1  2    2  1  1    2  1  2    2  1  2 
Relative 
Need 
1  2  1    1  2  2    1  2  1    1  2  1 
                               
(ii) Both Verbal and Quantitative                   
Equal Benefit  2  1  2    2  1  1    2  1  2    2  1  1 
Relative 
Need 
1  2  1    1  2  2    1  2  1    1  2  2 
 
For all observations for which the exact rank distance between relative need and equal benefit is unknown, the best case assumes the maximum distance in 
favour of relative need; the worst case assumes the maximum in favour of equal benefit; the middle case assumes a weighted linear combination of possible 
distances where the weight decreases with rank distance.  PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
 







General notes to appendix tables: 
 
•  *p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01 
•  The odds ratios presented are sometimes referred to as relative risk ratios (e.g., in STATA) 
•  The distributional alternative: 
o  ED = equal division of the goods  
o  EB = division to equalize benefits across recipients  
o  MB = division to maximize total benefits   
o  RN = division according to relative need across the individuals  
o  MM = maximin allocation. 
•  All multinomial logit analyses adjust the standard errors for lack of independent among repeated observations. 
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Table A1:  Multinomial Logit Results: Odds Ratios for Judgments Regarding the Most-fair and Least-fair Divisions with 
Quantitative Information Only 
 
   
Goods 
Effect 
   
Sample Effect 




  Pills  
vs. 
 Apples 
  University 
 vs.  
Community 







Most Fair             
             
Observations           1109             1109                554           1109 
Wald Chi
2            27.2***              24.3***               15.2***            16.6*** 
             
ED vs. EB          0.500***            0.744             0.444***          0.531*** 
MB vs. EB          0.728            0.172***             2.037          0.385*** 
MB vs. ED          1.458            0.232***             4.590***          0.725 
             
Least Fair             
             
Observations          1120            1120              560          1120 
Wald Chi
2             7.3**             45.8***               1.5           15.8*** 
             
ED vs. EB         1.899**           2.019**            1.434         1.777* 
MB vs. EB         1.217           6.020***            0.885         2.881*** 
MB vs. ED         0.641**           2.981***            0.617         1.622** 
             
Note: The analysis of Most Fair for dropped 11 observations with allocations not listed in  
the survey (listed as “Other” in Table 2A).   PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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Table A2:  Multinomial Logit Results: Odds Ratios for the Most-fair and Least-fair Divisions  
  Verbal Information Only    Both Verbal and Quantitative Information 
  Goods 
Effect 
  Sample Effect  Sex Effect    Goods Effect  Sample 
Effect 
Sex Effect 
   
Pills vs. 
Apples 
  University 
 vs.  
Community 
Females 
 vs.  
Males 
   
Pills vs. Apples 
University 
 vs.  
Community 
Females 
 vs.  
Males 
Most Fair                 
Observations           1120             1120           1120             1120           1120           1120 
Wald Chi
2            30.8***              15.3***             3.4              26.3***            16.2***             5.9 
  ED vs. RN          0.427***            1.129          1.001            0.463***          0.912          0.667** 
  EB vs. RN          1.328**            1.488**          1.846            1.133          0.849          0.740** 
  MM vs. RN          0.840            0.666*          0.690*            1.308*          0.768          0.987 
  MX vs. RN          1.517**            0.792          0.847            0.996          0.262***          0.889 
  ED vs. EB          0.322***            0.759          1.184            0.409***          1.074          0.901 
  MM vs. EB          0.633**            0.447***          0.816            1.154           0.905          1.333 
  MX vs. EB          1.142            0.532***          1.002            0.879          0.309***          1.202 
  ED vs. MM          0.509**            1.696*          1.450            0.354***          1.188          0.676 
  MX vs. MM          1.806***            1.189          1.815            0.762          0.342***          0.901 
  MX vs. ED          3.549***            0.701          0.846            2.150**          0.288***          1.333 
Least Fair                 
Observations          1120            1120          1120            1120          1120          1120 
Wald Chi
2           16.5***             49.1***           13.7***             30.7***           33.7***           15.6*** 
  ED vs. RN         1.117           2.595**         1.620           1.865*         3.327***         1.978* 
  EB vs. RN         1.140           0.915         0.671           1.722         2.893**          0.646 
  MM vs. RN         0.630*           3.091***         1.583           1.485         2.345*         0.982 
  MX vs. RN         0.824           5.060***         1.217           0.832         5.858***         1.723 
  ED vs. EB         0.980           2.836***         2.414***           1.083         1.150         3.060*** 
  MM vs. EB         0.552**           3.378***         2.360***           0.862         0.811         1.520 
  MX vs. EB         0.723           5.530***         1.815**           0.483**         2.025**         2.667*** 
  ED vs. MM         1.774***           0.840         1.023           1.256         1.419         2.014** HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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  MX vs. MM         1.310           1.637**         0.769           0.560***         2.499***         1.755** 
  MX vs. ED         0.738**           1.950***         0.752**           0.446***         1.761***         0.872 
Table A3:  Odds Ratios for Sample and Sex Effects with Simultaneous Control 
  Verbal Only    Both Verbal and Quantitative 
  Sample Effect  Sex Effect    Sample Effect  Sex Effect 
  University 
 vs.  
Community 
Females 
 vs.  
Males 
  University 
 vs.  
Community 
Females 
 vs.  
Males 
Most Fair           
Observations                            1120 
          
                          1120 
            Wald Chi
2                             19.5*** 
            
                           19.6** 
                ED vs. RN          1.137          0.971            1.078          0.775 
  EB vs. RN          1.588***          0.761            1.198          0.756** 
  MM vs. RN          0.713          0.748            0.756          0.916 
  MX vs. RN          0.814          0.889            0.582***          0.969 
  ED vs. EB          0.716          1.277            0.900          1.022 
  MM vs. EB          0.449***          0.983            0.631          1.207 
  MX vs. EB          0.513***          1.169            0.486***          1.278 
  ED vs. MM          1.594          1.299            1.426          0.847 
  MX vs. MM          1.142          1.889            0.770          1.058 
  MX vs. ED          0.716          0.916            0.540**          1.250 
Least Fair           
Observations                             1120 
         
                          1120 
         Wald Chi
2                              60.5*** 
          
                           76.1*** 
             ED vs. RN         2.427***         1.321           2.682***         1.393 
  EB vs. RN         1.004         0.670           1.607          0.596 
  MM vs. RN         2.939***         1.234           2.806***         1.098 
  MX vs. RN         5.283***         0.833           4.536***         1.064 
  ED vs. EB         2.417***         1.971**           1.669         2.337*** 
  MM vs. EB         2.926***         1.842**           1.746*         1.842* 
  MX vs. EB         5.261***         1.243           2.823***         1.786** 
  ED vs. MM         0.826         1.071           0.956         1.269 PREFERENCES OVER THE FAIR DIVISION OF GOODS:  INFORMATION, GOOD AND SAMPLE EFFECTSIN A HEALTH CONTEXT 
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  MX vs. MM         1.799***         0.675           1,617***         0.969 
  MX vs. ED         2.177***         0.631***           1.691***         0.764* HURLEY J, BUCKLEY N, CUFF K, GIACOMINI M, CAMERON D,  
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Table A4:  Good-Sample Interaction Effects with Quantitative Information Only  
 
                 
Goods x Sample               
   
Goods Effect: 
Pills vs. Apples 
  Sample 
Effect: 
University vs.  
Community 
  Interaction Effect 
 
Pills x University 
   
 
         
         
Most Fair                 
  ED vs. EB        0.526***          0.772           0.902    Obs    1109 
  MB vs. EB        0.882          0.258***           0.335**    Wald 
Chi
2 
  45.4*** 
  MB vs. ED        1.677          0.334**           0.371       
                 
Least Fair                 
  ED vs. EB        2.361***          2.881**           0.545    Obs    1120 
  MB vs. EB        1.139          5.660***           1.137    Wald 
Chi
2 
   59.6*** 
  MB vs. ED        0.482***          1.965**           2.088**       
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Table A5: Good-Sample Interaction Effects with Verbal Information Only  
   
Goods Effect: 
Pills vs. Apples 
  Sample 
Effect: 
University vs.  
Community 
  Interaction Effect 
 
Pills x University 
   
 
         
         
Most Fair                 
ED vs. RN        0.480**          1.182          0.813    Obs     1120 
EB vs. RN        1.120          1.281          1.324    Wald 
Chi
2 
    49.8*** 
MM vs. RN        0.738          0.586**          1.318       
MX vs. RN        1.692**          0.916          0.793       
ED vs. EB        0.429**          0.923          0.614       
MM vs. EB        0.659          0.458***          0.996       
MX vs. EB        1.511          0.715          0.599       
ED vs. MM        0.650          2.016**          0.617       
MX vs. MM        2.293***          1.562          0.602       
MX vs. ED        3.526***          0.775          0.975       
                 
Least Fair                 
ED vs. RN        1.295          3.175***          0.686    Obs     1120 
EB vs. RN        1.318          1.193          0.607    Wald 
Chi
2 
    69.7*** 
MM vs. RN        0.750          3.759***          0.660       
MX vs. RN        0.557*          4.260***          1.551       
ED vs. EB        0.983          2.661**          1.130       
MM vs. EB        0.569          3.150***          1.088       
MX vs. EB        0.423**          3.571***          2.556*       
ED vs. MM        1.727**          0.845          1.036       
MX vs. MM        0.743          1.134          2.349**       
MX vs. ED        0.430***          1.342          2.262***       
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Table A6: Good-Sample Interaction Effects with Both Verbal and Quantitative 
Information   
   
Goods Effect: 
Pills vs. Apples 
  Sample 
Effect: 
University vs.  
Community 
  Interaction Effect 
 
Pills x University 
   
 
         
         
Most Fair                 
ED vs. RN        0.467***          0.928          0.989    Obs     1120 
EB vs. RN        1.286          0.955          0.797    Wald 
Chi
2 
    42.7*** 
MM vs. RN        1.417          0.829          0.865       
MX vs. RN        0.878          0.193***          1.755       
ED vs. EB        0.363***          0.972          1.241       
MM vs. EB        1.102          1.102          1.086       
MX vs. EB        0.683          0.202***          2.202       
ED vs. MM        0.329***          1.120          1.144       
MX vs. MM        0.620          0.233***          2.029       
MX vs. ED        1.882          0.208***          1.774       
                 
Least Fair                 
ED vs. RN        1.534          2.687          1.287    Obs     1120 
EB vs. RN        1.436          2.333          1.306    Wald 
Chi
2 
    68.9*** 
MM vs. RN        2.154*          4.392**          0.327       
MX vs. RN        0.870          6.934***          0.731       
ED vs. EB        1.068          1.152          0.985       
MM vs. EB        1.500          1.882          0.250*       
MX vs. EB        0.606          2.972**          0.560       
ED vs. MM        0.712          0.612          3.942***       
MX vs. MM        0.404***          1.579          2.239*       
MX vs. ED        0.567**          2.581***          0.568       
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